Licenses
Rank Group Casino Operators Settle With UK Gambling Commission
Three casino operators owned by Rank Group PLC will pay £5 million after a Gambling Commission investigation found anti-money laundering and social responsibility failures at their land-based venues, the regulator announced on October 7, 2026. The companies run 51 casinos across Great Britain and will also undergo a third-party audit to ensure they are effectively implementing anti-money laundering and safer gambling policies, procedures and controls.
The three operators are Grosvenor Casinos Limited, Grosvenor Casinos (GC) Limited and Gaming Group Limited. All £5 million of the settlement will be directed to the Government’s Consolidated Fund.
Licence Review and Breached Requirements
The case began with a licence review of Grosvenor Casinos Limited under section 116 of the Gambling Act 2005, commenced following information provided to the Commission and key event notices submitted by the licensee, according to the public statement published by the Commission on October 7, 2026. While the review was underway, further intelligence received by the Commission prompted a targeted compliance assessment of one of the licensee’s venues, conducted on June 13, 2025.
The review found the licensee breached paragraphs 2 and 3 of licence condition 12.1.1, which requires operators to maintain appropriate policies, procedures and controls to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, to implement those controls effectively and keep them under review, and to take account of learning and guidelines published by the Commission. It also found the licensee failed to comply with paragraphs 1(b), 1(c) and 2 of social responsibility code provision 3.4.1 on premises-based customer interaction, which requires operators to interact with customers in a way that minimises the risk of gambling-related harm, to interact with customers who may be at risk, to understand the impact and effectiveness of those interactions, and to take account of the Commission’s customer interaction guidance. Under section 82(1) of the Act, compliance with a social responsibility code provision is itself a condition of the licence.
The regulatory settlement was proposed to the Commission, and accepted, on behalf of Grosvenor Casinos Limited and the wider group, identified in the statement as Grosvenor Casinos (GC) Limited and Gaming Group Limited, because the group adopted the same policies, procedures and controls.
Anti-Money Laundering and Safer-Gambling Findings
Elements of the licensee’s anti-money laundering policies, procedures and controls did not adequately mitigate the risk posed by money laundering and terrorist financing, the review found. The policies had not been updated appropriately: changes to the Money Laundering Regulations made in 2020 had not been properly accounted for, resulting in a customer not being rated high risk when it would have been appropriate. A level of decision-making autonomy given to venue management, though not problematic in principle, resulted in instances where evidence of source of funds or source of wealth should have been obtained and submitted for close scrutiny but was not. In one such case, where evidence was obtained but not passed to central compliance teams for scrutiny, a customer lost significant funds that may or may not have been their own.
A lack of clarity in parts of the controls produced inappropriate risk levels for high-risk customers, allowed high-risk sources of funds to be used without appropriate scrutiny, and inappropriately extended timescales for diligence checks on certain high-risk customers. The same lack of clarity applied to the licensee’s process for assessing cryptocurrency assets relied on by customers as a partial source of funds or wealth, which appeared to require only that such assets be verified as having been converted into fiat currency, such as pounds sterling or US dollars, through an appropriate bank account before being used to gamble.
Officials also identified instances where the licensee’s published policies were not implemented effectively. A customer returning to the licensee’s venues after a significant break lost around £200,000 in two visits without adequate photographic identification on file or evidence of income recorded in line with the licensee’s policies. A customer playing exclusively with cash recycled about £85,000 through a venue over approximately 11 weeks without the money laundering risk level being raised, and enhanced due diligence was not adequately conducted until losses reached approximately £13,000. Records also showed that one customer’s use of cryptocurrency assets as a source of funds, and another customer identified as a student from China, failed to cause either customer’s risk level to be increased, despite policies mandating that such individuals would not be classed as standard risk.
On social responsibility, the review found customers’ perceived wealth or winning position was used by staff as a rationale for perfunctory safer gambling interactions. A well-known and long-standing customer won approximately £260,000 in a short period and then lost around £250,000 in 12 days without any safer gambling interactions being recorded. Another long-standing and wealthy customer with an extensive history with the licensee lost about £50,000 without interactions taking place.
Interactions also failed to escalate when the licensee’s policies said they should. A customer playing with verified winnings from another operator was permitted to lose approximately £25,000 before safer gambling interactions took place. Several interactions followed for reasons including the frequency and length of visits, but the licensee did not escalate its approach, whether by imposing limits on time or spend, reducing access to debit card facilities or other appropriate measures, until the customer acknowledged the winnings had been exhausted. Over the next six weeks the customer was allowed to lose around £11,000 before a suspension was imposed.
Officials saw records of individuals returning from self-exclusion who were permitted to play with significant funds and lose heavily. Customer records also showed repeated safer gambling interactions at the same level, such as reality checks and loss and play-frequency alerts, that did not alter customer behaviour; in one case, repeated interactions relating to losses and velocity of play resulted in losses of more than £73,000. Officials did not see evidence that such events were evaluated or used to inform changes to policy and procedures, or to remind or retrain staff.
Settlement Terms and Commission Comment
The settlement consists of a payment in lieu of a financial penalty of £5,012,261 on behalf of the licensee and the wider group, with the money directed to the Consolidated Fund; agreement to the publication of a statement of facts; a payment towards the Commission’s costs of investigating the case; and a commitment to undertake a third-party external audit of the licensee’s business within six months of the conclusion of the Commission’s licence review.
In considering the resolution, the Commission treated as aggravating factors that the licensee had previously been issued with formal advice regarding similar areas of concern and that the Commission had previously issued public statements about similar issues observed at other operators. Mitigating factors were that the licensee swiftly implemented changes designed to remedy the failings and that it fully co-operated with the investigation.
Sue Young, Executive Director of Operations at the Gambling Commission, said: “Larger enforcement cases are often associated with online gambling but, as today’s announcement shows, the risks of anti-money laundering and social responsibility failures are equally alive in the land-based sector.”
Young advised all premises-based operators to take a careful look at the case and ensure their own businesses are not making the same mistakes. The Commission’s statement also sets out good-practice questions for the wider industry, asking operators to consider whether their anti-money laundering policies, procedures and controls would bear objective scrutiny, properly mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing and are implemented effectively; whether their safer gambling policies are effective and developed following consideration of the Commission’s guidance; and whether staff are properly trained to deal with the range of harm indicators set out in that guidance and to ensure anti-money laundering and safer gambling controls are effectively implemented.











