Licenties
Fourth Circuit Rejects Kalshi’s Bid to Block Maryland Wagering Law

Belangrijkste puntenHet Vierde Circuit bevestigde de afwijzing van het bevel zonder een gedeelde reden om…
Meer weergeven
- Het Vierde Circuit bevestigde de afwijzing van het bevel zonder een gedeelde reden om Kalshi af te wijzen.
- Gregory oordeelde dat Maryland reguleert wie sportweddenschappen aanbiedt, niet of Kalshi contracten mag noteren.
- Thacker concludeerde dat de contracten van Kalshi geen swaps zijn omdat zij aannemen dat de wedstrijd plaatsvindt.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on 17 november 2026, affirmed a district court’s refusal to block Maryland from applying its sports-wagering laws to KalshiEX’s sports event contracts. The divided panel ruled only on Kalshi’s request for a preliminary injunction, not the final merits of its federal preemption lawsuit.
Judges Roger Gregory and Stephanie Thacker joined the court’s judgment but filed separate concurrences, leaving no single shared rationale for affirmance. Gregory assumed without deciding that the contracts were swaps, while Thacker concluded they were not. Judge DeAndrea Gist Benjamin dissented and would have vacated the denial and remanded for further proceedings.
Kalshi operates a designated contract market overseen by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Users trade standardized financial contracts tied to future events, including sporting outcomes, directly with other users rather than wagering against the house. Prices are determined by supply and demand. That exchange structure underpins Kalshi’s argument that the Commodity Exchange Act places the contracts under exclusive CFTC jurisdiction and displaces state gambling rules.
Maryland generally prohibits sports wagering unless the operator holds a state license. The requirements at issue also include data-security obligations, prohibitions on deceptive advertising, and restrictions on advertising directed at people barred from sports wagering and other at-risk individuals. State gaming authorities sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter on 7 april 2025, maintaining that offering the contracts to Maryland residents without a license was unlawful and directing the company to stop within 15 days.
Kalshi responded with an 21 april 2025 lawsuit against Maryland’s attorney general, gaming agencies and officials, alleging that federal commodities law preempts the state requirements as applied to trading on its exchange. It simultaneously sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement.
To obtain that interim relief, Kalshi needed to establish likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm, a favorable balance of equities and that an injunction would serve the public interest. The district court denied the motion on 1 augustus 2025, after finding that Kalshi had not shown likely success. It assumed without deciding that the contracts were swaps but concluded that Congress had not clearly expressed an intention to remove state authority over gambling, and therefore did not address the remaining injunction factors.
Different Routes to Affirmance
Gregory’s concurrence began with gambling’s place within the states’ traditional police powers. He reasoned that statutory uncertainty should not displace that authority without a clear and manifest congressional purpose, even if Kalshi’s contracts qualify as swaps.
His analysis read the Commodity Exchange Act’s exclusive-jurisdiction provision together with its Special Rule for event contracts. That rule allows the CFTC to determine that a contract involving gaming is contrary to the public interest, after which it cannot be listed or traded through a registered entity. The CFTC’s implementing regulation separately directs registered entities not to list or clear event contracts involving gaming. Gregory concluded that this framework treats gaming contracts differently from other derivatives but leaves their jurisdictional status unclear.
The concurrence then addressed why continued trading does not resolve that uncertainty. A designated market can generally list a new product without prior formal CFTC approval by certifying its compliance with federal law and supplying the exchange’s supporting legal analysis. CFTC review occurs afterward. Gregory reasoned that Kalshi’s contracts remain listed because the company certified their compliance and the agency has not issued a final determination requiring their removal, not because the CFTC affirmatively approved their listing or shielded them from state law.
Gregory separately rejected Kalshi’s conflict-preemption argument. Maryland’s requirements govern who may offer sports wagering to people within the state; they do not determine whether a contract may be listed or traded on a designated market, which remains a CFTC question. Kalshi could comply with both regimes by satisfying Maryland’s licensing requirements or declining to offer particular contracts there while continuing to operate its federally regulated exchange.
The Divide Over Swaps
Thacker reached affirmance by deciding the question Gregory left open. The federal definition of a swap requires payment to depend on the occurrence, nonoccurrence or extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence. She concluded that Kalshi’s contracts assume a sporting contest will be completed and pay according to its result, which does not satisfy the definition’s occurrence requirement.
Her analysis rejected dictionary definitions describing an event as an outcome where those meanings were marked archaic, treating the sporting event as the contest or match itself. Thacker warned that Kalshi’s interpretation would bring nearly every sports bet under federal swap rules, including restrictions on retail swaps conducted away from designated markets. She found that result incompatible with the statutory text and the Dodd-Frank Act’s financial-stability purpose, leaving the contracts outside the CFTC’s exclusive regulatory authority and open to state co-regulation.
Benjamin’s dissent treated an outcome such as a team winning as capable of being an occurrence in its own right. She concluded that the sports event contracts are swaps subject to exclusive CFTC jurisdiction and that Maryland’s application of its gambling laws is preempted. The Special Rule’s treatment of gaming confirmed to her that gaming-related event contracts can exist, with the CFTC responsible for distinguishing gambling from legitimate risk-avoidance uses.
Benjamin also identified potential economic consequences and hedging uses for sponsors, hospitality businesses, ticket resellers and sportsbooks. In her analysis, speculative or entertainment trading by other participants would not disqualify the contracts because the statutory definition requires a potential economic consequence, not business use by every participant. She nevertheless acknowledged Maryland’s concern about a limiting principle, noting that an unrestricted definition could extend to casino games, office pools, charity raffles and private bets.
Other federal appeals courts have also reached different results. The Third Circuit found preemption because it treated Kalshi’s sports-related event contracts as swaps under exclusive CFTC jurisdiction, while the Sixth and Ninth Circuits rejected preemption. The Fourth Circuit’s decision leaves Maryland’s requirements available to state regulators at this preliminary stage, but its three separate opinions supply no common answer to the federal question dividing those courts.













